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President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 516th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I learnt with deep regret the news of the passing away last week of His Excellency Janos Kadar, former Prime Minister of Hungary, who for a long time exerted considerable political influence in his own country and had a significant role in the development of European co-operation. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to extend our condolences to the Hungarian delegation and request it to transmit our expressions of sympathy to its Government and to the family of the late leader.

I should like to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who will be our first speaker today. In so doing, I should like to stress the important contribution that Finland, a non-member, has been making to the work of this Conference on a number of agenda items. I am sure that all members will follow his statement with particular interest.

The Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sweden. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Finland, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, first of all I would wish to express my great appreciation for the fact that I have the possibility of addressing the CD under your chairmanship.

I shall devote my statement today to the issue of chemical weapons, although Finland attaches great importance to all items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. A complete ban on chemical weapons has clearly become one of the foremost priorities of international disarmament efforts. It is an issue of today, not of any undefined later day in the future. The negotiations for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention within the Conference on Disarmament are where our efforts should be concentrated. The global approach is the only one that can have durable results. At the same time Finland is ready to participate in complementary international efforts as long as they truly uphold the main objective and do not lead to any diversions from it. It was in this spirit that we participated in the Paris Conference last January. It is in this spirit that we support the United Nations Secretary-General's role in investigating reports of possible use of chemical weapons and the work of the qualified experts' group in developing this procedure. It will be in this spirit that we shall go to Canberra next September.

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In Paris last January the world community, practically in its entirety, condemned once again these sinister weapons of mass destruction, and gave strengthened impetus to the on-going negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference called for the redoubling of efforts in these negotiations; and redoubled they were. The Conference also called for all States to make their contribution to these negotiations. As a result new countries joined the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as observers. Despite these positive developments one can sense widespread disappointment after the spring session of the CD as to the concrete results achieved in the aftermath of the Paris Conference. We acknowledge the fact that an effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention is both technically and politically complex and no quick breakthroughs are to be expected. During the spring session several issues which had not been discussed for some years were taken up again. This was helpful as a reminder of the wide scope of issues that still have to be addressed. Lengthy discussions were dedicated to other issues, which, although relevant to the final outcome, could now be left aside for the time being in order to have more time for tackling the major problems.

We share the concern of several other delegations that the impetus created by the Paris Conference will wither away in the absence of meaningful concrete results on the major questions. We strongly feel that the time has come for shifting the main emphasis in the negotiations to the politically problematic aspects. This would also help the technical experts to correctly focus their work on the real needs of the convention. Otherwise the technical discussions will become a never-ending story of new gaps and new theoretical possibilities to be covered. The basic information available to the negotiators is already sufficient for this shift to take place.

I will now turn to some of the issues at hand in the negotiations which we consider to be of major significance.

First, there is the issue of existing stocks of chemical weapons and their destruction. It is of cardinal importance for the credibility of the convention that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning and that their destruction be promptly initiated. The order of destruction needs to foreclose any possibilities for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention enters into force. It goes without saying that the verification measures covering this issue have to be the strictest possible under the convention. We have welcomed the information the two major possessors of chemical weapons have provided about their destruction programmes already under way. As was pointed out during the spring session the safe destruction of the existing stocks is both technically difficult and costly. We hope that the technology that has been developed for this purpose by the Soviet Union and the United States could be made available in due course to any interested country. This would ensure that all existing stocks were disposed of safely within the lime-limits set in the Convention.

Secondly, effective verification that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Unlike the arrangements for the destruction of the existing stocks, these

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measures have no fixed time-limit. When approaching this issue one has to keep constantly in mind the purpose of the convention, which sets the limits to the verification measures. The main task is to verify non-production of chemical weapons. We have not undertaken to monitor the whole production of all the chemical industries of the world. Not even the production of dangerous or lethal chemicals as such. We are interested in the weaponizable chemicals, in weaponizable quantities, and, in making sure that they are not being used to produce weapons. Beyond that, the verification of non-production of minor quantities in a cost-effective way will become increasingly difficult. The best we can strive for is to create a régime that can be used to clear any doubts of non-compliance. If possible, that should be done even before such doubts become serious. In practical terms that would mean a régime that allows selective intrusiveness, includes a factor of surprise, and uses technically and scientifically sound methods. We are convinced that all the main elements required are already in existence. The technical methods have been developed to the extent that non-production of the named chemicals can be verified. The further tuning of these methods now depends on clear definitions of all parts of the régime.

The concept of mandatory short-notice on-site inspections and the details of that part of the verification régime should be taken up as a matter of priority during this summer session. The challenge inspections and the different proposals concerning ad hoc procedures should be moulded into a consistent régime which allows for a flexible application of measures to the variety of situations that may arise. Without going into the details of such a régime we feel that the inspections should always be conducted by the Technical Secretariat. There should also be a possibility for the Technical Secretariat to initiate the process. The most important feature, however, is that the inspections falling under this category should constitute a normal procedure under the convention. Their role should be regarded as preventive and not as offensive or as a last resort. Care should also be taken to create reasonable safeguards against abuse of the régime. The inspection activities should not decrease the confidence of the country being inspected or its industry in regard to the overall usefulness of the convention.

The third part is the relationship between the chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In our opinion the convention will have to supersede the provisions of the Protocol, including the reservations made to it. The convention bans chemical weapons from the day it comes into force. The destruction period of 10 years is there to create a realistic timespan to get rid of the existing stocks safely. When the use of chemical weapons is prohibited by the convention there can be no excuses for circumventing that obligation. The maintenance in force of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol would maintain the option of the second use of chemical weapons. This would clearly undermine the convention.

Fourth comes the right of every nation to strive for the normal and legitimate development of its own industrial base including the chemical industries. The convention cannot compel the Governments of the States parties on behalf of the individual enterprises to transfer technology when it

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is against the interests and will of the owners of that technology. However, nothing in the convention should prevent the transfer of technology for permitted purposes. Under the convention the verification régime is for the purpose of ultimately verifying that the technologies and chemicals are not used illegitimately.

We clearly understand that the inclusion of this kind of a provision in the convention is important to the nations whose chemical industry is in the early stages of development. As a confidence-builder it is comparable to the value some other countries, including my own, attach to the verification provisions. The export controls that many countries are preparing or already imposing on relevant chemicals and technologies should be regarded as necessary provisional measures. In the absence of a global ban the spread of chemical weapons and the widening availability of long-range delivery systems for them is everyone's concern. The spectre of long-range chemical warfare should not be allowed to go free. After the chemical weapons convention has come into force the importance of these controls will diminish. Their application to trade between the States parties could then be relaxed.

Universal adherence to the Convention is of utmost importance for it to be effective. The legitimate concerns and interests of all nations should be given equal attention during the negotiations. This can be done in two parallel ways without hampering the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament as the negotiating body. First, all countries willing to make an active contribution should be encouraged to do so. The observer countries here in the CD should make full use of this opportunity to put forward their views and have them duly reflected in the process. The number of observers has grown considerably since earlier years, and we hope that this trend will continue. Secondly, efforts should be made to inform those countries which, for different reasons, cannot participate in the negotiations even as observers. In this field we acknowledge the valuable work done by Australia in promoting regional awareness about chemical weapons issues.

I would like to turn now to some more detailed and technical aspects of the convention. Earlier I touched upon some general aspects of the verification of compliance with the convention. However, verification does not only involve working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself. The development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out the specific verification tasks that those procedures entail is equally important. Moreover, this work is continuous and requires constant attention, testing, research and improvement in all the fields connected with the inspection activities.

It is precisely these aspects of CW verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project is conducted by a team of scientists and financed by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Project develops instrumental methods for detection, identification and analysis of chemical warfare agents. The results of this work, as we know, have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the Finnish Blue Books. The latest

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report, the fourteenth of the series, will be introduced here in the very near future. The new Blue Book is a revised version of Report D.1, "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament" which was presented to the CD last summer. Revisions have been made on the basis of experience gained in applying our procedures to 40 chemicals. A chapter on liquid chromatography has been added, and all experimental data have been presented in the Appendix.

During the last years the Finnish Project has devoted considerable efforts to some of the basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the Convention. These are: instrumentation, standard operating procedures and computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals.

The instrumentation of the verification laboratories has been described in the recent working paper submitted by Finland (CD/CW/WP.253) which was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the meeting with the representatives of chemical industries two weeks ago.

So far there is no generally accepted method for CW verification analyses. The standard operating procedures designed by our Project try to fill that gap. The need for generally accepted procedures is evident. All the analyses of the samples taken by the inspection teams should be carefully handled by identical procedures and analysed by exactly the same methods. Only then can the results become comparable. Only, then can they be universally relied upon, and leave no doubts about the scientific value of the findings. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated, as any violation will immediately become a political issue of large international dimensions. There must be no uncertainty about the soundness of the results.

Moreover, such precision combined with total impartiality can only be guaranteed if there is a network of qualified laboratories especially accredited to conduct the analyses. On one hand, the scientific and operational quality of these laboratories would have to be constantly tested and verified. On the other hand, the origin and nature of the real samples would have to be concealed from the laboratories. This would guarantee the impartiality of the analyses and minimize the risk of the disclosure of confidential information.

In order to guarantee world-wide distribution of the accredited laboratories, training in the analytical methods and in the use of the instruments is crucial. Also the inspectors of the International Inspectorate will have to be trained in these skills. Finland announced at the Paris Conference last January that it would be willing to provide this type of training for chemists from developing countries. I am now in a position to give more details of this training programme. It will be made available at this first stage to the interested member States of the Conference on Disarmament belonging to the Group of 21. The training course will have a duration of four months, and three analytical chemists can be trained at each course. We envisage organizing two courses a year, and thus six qualified

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chemists can be trained annually. Originally we had hoped to be able to offer training for a larger number of chemists at a time. However, doing that would necessarily have meant a considerable loss of quality in the instruction. The real instructor/trainee ratio of our programme of about one to one during the entire four-month period also reveals the dimensions of the training efforts that are required internationally well before the entry into force of the CW Convention. During our course the participants will be trained in sample collection, preparation of the samples, chromatographic methods, laboratory automation and the use of the computerized data base. Also, the basics of mass spectrometry and its use as the detector of a chromatograph will be taught. All the instruction is designed especially for the purposes of the CW verification. The cost of the training, travel from home country and back, accommodation as well as a daily allowance will be provided by Finland. The only financial implication for the sending Government would thus be the basic salary during the time of the course. We hope that this offer will meet the interests of several of the members of the Group of 21.

The computerized data base was first introduced to the CD a year ago, during the summer session of 1988. It will enable any analyst anywhere in the world to compare the results of his analysis with the characteristics of the scheduled chemicals stored in the data base. In an instant he will be able to tell for sure whether the compound he has been analysing is one of the scheduled compounds or not. This is an indispensable tool for the inspectors. To achieve the desired result, only one condition has to be met: the sampling, the handling of the samples, their analysis, and the instrumentation should follow the same detailed procedures that were followed when the data base was prepared. Again the need for the standard operating procedures is evident. Another prerequisite for the functioning of the data base is that the chemicals that are to be monitored must be individually defined. Broader definitions like families of compounds will not suffice. Furthermore, every one of these compounds must be synthesized and analysed for data storage. As of today the data base of the Finnish project includes 40 compounds. Here we should like to thank both the United Kingdom and Switzerland for having supplied us with the necessary material to get us where we are now in this work. In order to make it easier for everybody to visualize the functioning of the data base, a live demonstration of it will be arranged here in Geneva during the second week of August, to which all the members and observers of the CD will be invited.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the presidency. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of your important office.

My statement today relates to item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be very brief. Its main purpose is to comment on the expert contribution which will be provided at this afternoon's

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meeting of the Ad hoc Committee. As already announced in my plenary statement on our basic views on the matter on 11 April this year, we had asked an independent research institute in the Federal Republic of Germany to examine our positions and proposals introduced so far and to come up with a comprehensive view on the question of space-related confidence-building measures. Today Dr. Hubert Feigl from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik will share his findings with the members of the Committee. He will - in particular - deal with "objectives, realizable possibilities and problems of a multilateral protection régime for outer space" and related questions. Dr. Feigl will provide us with the independent view of a scientist. His arguments will speak for themselves. His paper is based on non-classified sources and its contents are subejct to verification. In the belief that more profound discussion will bring more progress my delegation would like to stimulate debate in the Ad hoc Committee on the basis of a well founded set of interrelated expert views.

Dr. Feigl's contribution will draw a kind of road map in this regard, pointing out which roads from his point of view are impossible or almost impossible and possible as far as a weapons-related ASAT ban is concerned and the implications this has for the objective of an ASAT ban itself. He will also be pointing out the roads which may more easily lead to the intended improvement of the protection of space in general and the protection of stability-related satellites in particular.

When, in 1986, my delegation introduced the subject of space-related confidence-building measures, including a "code of conduct" and "rules of the road", as an idea which could substantially contribute to attenuating the effects of unintended escalation and to limiting the risks arising from misunderstandings in crisis situations, the corresponding proposals seemed to be too technical and too complicated to be dealt with in the Ad hoc Committee at that juncture. In the meantime the Committee has gained experience and achieved a much better understanding of the many questions involved. My delegation feels encouraged to reiterate its former proposals as contained in PV.345 of 6 March 1986 and developed further in my plenary statement of 11 April this year and the corresponding contributions to the work of the Ad hoc Committee. We know that we shall have to convince the Conference of the usefulness and adequacy of these proposals. The presence of an independent expert is a welcome opportunity to re-examine them in a critical common effort.

It may be useful and necessary to briefly describe the background against which this effort should be seen. There is no doubt that certain space objects - such as satellites with verification, observation, communication and command functions - are vital components of strategic stability. Accordingly, it would be counterproductive to prohibit, per se, all military activities in outer space. Multilateral arms control and disarmament matters in the outer space area cannot be considered independently of basic developments at the bilateral level. Many of the space-related problems will - by their nature - remain the domain of the two main space Powers. The prevention of an arms race in outer space by adequate and appropriate arms control measures touches

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upon basic questions of strategic stability between these Powers. The related questions have still to be solved in the bilateral talks. We believe that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of these negotiations.

On the other hand, it is widely agreed that in view of dynamic technological developments, many aspects of a future outer space order inevitably necessitate comprehensive regulation by the international community as such. It is rightly recognized, too, that more and more States are becoming space Powers or participating in important programmes for the exploration and utilization of outer space. Furthermore, all States could be threatened by a possible misuse of that environment. Thus there are good reasons for an approach requiring greater participation by the international community. The creation of a robust, stable future space order is a task ahead. My delegation will continue to actively contribute to preparing the ground for its realization.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Let me first of all congratulate you, as representative of a friendly nation, Mongolia, on your assumption of the responsible post of Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. Your great diplomatic experience, including our experience of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, gives us every a surance that your efforts to organize the Conference's work during this important period of its summer session will be attended by success. At the same time we wish you every success in performing your duties as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, a position you are now occupying for the second time. Since today, 11 July, is the national holiday of the Mongolian People's Republic - People's Revolution Day - I should like to take this opportunity to extend our sincere congratulations to Ambassador Bayart and the whole Mongolian delegation.

I should also like to thank our doyen, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, for presiding over the work of the Conference in June with his customary wisdom.

We welcome among us today Mr. Karhilo, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, whose important statement we listened to with great interest. Mr. Karhilo's presence here and his statement confirm once again the active position taken in disarmament matters by Finland, with which my country has traditionally maintained close goodneighbourly relations.

We should like to convey our deep sympathy to the Hungarian delegation on the death of Comrade J. Kadar, who was leader of his country for many years. We would ask the delegation to pass on our heartfelt condolences to the Government of Hungary and to the deceased's family and friends.

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The Soviet delegation in its previous statement of 22 June expounded the basic approach of the Soviet Union to a broad range of disarmament issues in a wider context of creating a secure democratic world. Today I would like to elaborate in more detail on the problem which is in our view central to the work of the Conference, that is, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would hardly be an overstatement to say that we are living through a critical turning point in the negotiations, with all the controversies that are to be expected at such times.

To speak of the positive aspects, there is in particular the fact that the draft convention is in an advanced state of preparation. At the Conference held in Paris earlier this year, virtually all States assumed, at a high level, moral and political commitments in relation to the earliest conclusion of the convention. Many countries and groups of countries have recently stated, individually or jointly, their support for the cause of banning chemical weapons. The relevant provisions of the comprehensive arms control and disarmament concept adopted at the NATO summit in Brussels are very much welcome in this connection, and particularly the intention expressed in it by the NATO leaders of concluding at an early date a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable treaty banning any chemical weapon, its development, production, storage or transfer. We also notice that the most recently published NATO documents seem to suggest that chemical weapons are not regarded as an integral element of deterrence, which in view of NATO's general philosophy of arms limitation raises hopes of a truly complete renunciation by all its members of this gruesome means of extermination. As for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the leaders of the allied countries at their summit meeting held literally a few days ago in Bucharest called for efforts to speed up the preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stocks.

Finally, among the positive elements we have are the restructuring of the negotiating process carried out under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Morel, the presence of a significantly greater number of observers at the negotiations, and the fact that progress towards a convention has gone beyond the limits of pure negotiations and reached a stage when a whole number of countries have started practical preparations for their participation in the future agreement.

On the other hand, during the spring session of 1989 and in the early days of the summer session, the multilateral negotiations failed to reach the desired tempo. We get the impression that external political stimulus is taking too long to be transformed into progress in negotiations which necessarily requires the readiness of every participant to take resolute steps and make bold compromises. A considerable portion of time this year was consumed by the discussion of technical details. In itself, this might be no bad thing, but even then we were often going round in circles. The devil is in the details, they say, and exorcizing him from wherever he might be always requires an extreme effort of will, which in our case, naturally, means political will. It is also needed to resolve some of the still outstanding

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basic issues. The foregoing does not necessarily imply that nothing has been achieved recently. One positive example in the area of technical details is the adjustment of the schedules of chemicals covered by the convention on the basis of limiting the radicals of alkyl and o-alkyl fragments in the respective chemicals, undertaken by the Chairman of Group 4. In the realm of political problems the efforts undertaken by Ambassador Morel on the composition of the Executive Council and challenge inspections (article IX) are highly commendable.

However, we can and must move ahead faster than we are now doing. Many representatives, in giving their analysis of the state of negotiations, stressed that any loss of time or momentum now is extremely dangerous and that the impetus generated in Paris would fail to be a long-term factor if not supported in Geneva. The Soviet delegation fully shares this opinion. Delay in the negotiations is all the more unacceptable in that it takes place against a background of dangerous trends in chemical weapons proliferation. Being decidedly opposed to the spread of chemical weapons, we lend our support to international efforts to counteract this threat and we are improving our national measures in this field. In doing so, we are fully aware that the only thoroughly effective solution to this problem is a comprehensive convention concluded at the earliest date and without any linkage to other disarmament measures.

Negotiations are not the only way we use to pursue this goal. In the USSR the appropriate agencies are preparing recommendations on the order and time of construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities, including their location. Their capacity will ensure the destruction of our entire CW stock in the Soviet Union in the time period set by the draft convention. This will demand the solution of a whole set of problems related to the transport of the weapons, their disassembly and destruction. Priority attention is given here to environmental protection.

We are also engaged in active bilateral discussions with a whole range of countries on the problem of a chemical weapons ban. In particular, during the recent visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Bonn, a statement on a chemical weapons ban was adopted at the level of the ministers for foreign affairs. At the request of the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, this statement, together with the joint statement of the leaders of the two countries on the results of the visit, are being distributed as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/930 and CD/931).

In June, beginning right on the very first day of this summer session, the eleventh round of Soviet-United States discussions on a chemical weapons ban took place here in Geneva. This has been one of the most productive rounds since we began meeting with the United States delegation in pursuance of the agreement reached in Geneva in November 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Substantial progress was made as a result of intensive work at the plenaries, restricted meetings between the heads of delegations, and meetings of experts. This relates in the first instance to the draft paper on procedures for challenge inspections, which we believe might soon be submitted

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for examination to Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Considerable progress was also made in preparing proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities, though some questions relating to certain numerical parameters and terminology still need to be resolved. A useful discussion was held on permitted production and synthesis o Schedule I chemicals as well as on toxins. Finally, although no complete agreement has been reached as yet, we have made progress on a whole range of bilateral measures of confidence-building, openness and mutual inspection. These measures are to be implemented even before the future convention is signed. All in all, we are encouraged with the results of the round and hope that after some time they will have a favourable influence on the multilateral negotiations as well - the subject which I would now like to turn to.

We believe that by now the conditions are ripe for us to finish putting together the essential verification system. The basis for such a system is there - it is the combination of systematic and challenge inspections. Yet unresolved issues still remain in every area. We are convinced that challenge inspections without exemptions or the right of refusal, extending equally to any site or facility, be it military or civil, State-owned or private, are an essential element of the future verification system. We urge all those who have not yet done so to make an unequivocal statement that they accept the principle of such inspections. Should any members have specific difficulties, let them openly state where such difficulties lie.

We do not share the opinion which has sometimes been voiced here that challenge inspections are excessively confrontational. (By the way, I should like to ask whether it might not be as well for us to stop using the word "challenge" and say "request" instead.) At the same time we would be prepared to give an attentive look at the arguments of those delegations which believe they would be more comfortable if alongside the mechanism of challenge inspections the convention contained procedures which did not involve expressing suspicions about any State.

The proposal of the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections which could, as we understand it, be carried out at any site or facility could form a good basis for such an additional verification sub-system. True, we would prefer that quota limitations should only apply to the number of inspections which a State would be obliged to receive on its territory within a given period of time. The so-called active quota would not then be introduced. Otherwise, States would always have to be afraid of exhausting their quotas too quickly, and this in its turn could limit their real possibility of exercising the right of request. As for the passive quota, we believe it could amount to about five inspections per year. Provisions should also be worked out containing specific requirements for requests to make ad hoc inspections, namely, an indication of the location and the specific type of activity to be verified. This is necessary if such inspections are to be effective.

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The issues of what should be the starting point for challenge inspections and what their scope should be are of fundamental importance. Of equal importance is what the end result of these inspections should be. In our opinion, for the sake of having an effectively functioning convention mechanism there is everything to be said for taking no decisions as to compliance by a State with the convention when reports on challenge inspection results are discussed in the bodies of an international organization established under the convention. Instead, where necessary, recommendations would be adopted on measures to ensure compliance with the convention. Among such measures certain sanctions could also be considered. We believe that a similar procedure could also be applied to the consideration of reports on routine inspection results.

Recently, there have also been signs of progress in working out a régime of systematic verification, in particular within the framework of article VI of the draft convention. In this context we take note with satisfaction of the support given by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf to the idea of including Schedule 2B in the convention.

We also support the idea that in addition to the so-called "régime" schedules of chemicals, on the basis of which certain measures of limitation or verification would be taken, a "marker" list - or as it is called - a "waiting and warning" list should be envisaged for substances capable of posing a risk for the purposes of the convention. The scientific and consultative council which would be established within the framework of an international organization unde the future convention and which would perform the function of keeping track c innovations in chemistry would also participate in drawing up the list. A part of the council's membership could be elected from candidates proposed by international scientific organizations.

Taking into account the view of a number of States that laboratory synthesis of Schedule I chemicals should be permitted not only for medical and research purposes, but also for the purposes of protection, we would be prepared to agree to such synthesis being carried out at a State's discretion either at a small-scale facility or at one laboratory synthesizing not more than 100 g of Schedule I chemicals, with its location and the names of the chemicals synthesized being declared. We do not propose that either this laboratory or any other laboratory synthesizing Schedule I chemicals should be subject to systematic international verification. At the same time we believe it is important to envisage approval and declaration by States parties of all laboratories synthesizing Schedule I chemicals for permitted purposes. A positive solution to this problem would considerably facilitate agreement on this section of the convention in general. As for production of Schedule I chemicals for pharmaceutical purposes outside a small-scale facility, we would be prepared to agree to the proposal that their annual quantity should not exceed 10 kg for each facility in question.

A number of delegations have recently expressed concern that with the verification systems under article VI as they now stand, multi-purpose facilities, as well as facilities which are not producing chemicals posing a

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risk for the purposes of the convention but whose characteristics would make it quite possible to organize such production, would not be covered. To a certain extent the solution to this problem would be facilitated if thresholds for declaration and verification were determined on the basis of the design capacity of facilities, rather than their production levels. It would also be useful for the Technical Secretariat to be entitled to submit independently a request for inspection if in the exercise of systematic verification activities by the Technical Secretariat a need arises to clarify certain obligations. We are also ready to consider constructively other proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of vertification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry and will support any verification measure leading to greater security. The solution of the problem of non-production of chemical weapons in industry is possible on the basis of a balance between the need to have the most stringent verification and the legitimate industrial and commercial interests of States parties to the convention.

Finalization of work on the system of verification would be much facilitated by the early introduction of international trial inspections under the experiment launched last year to test procedures for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry. As far as we see, some delegations have certain apprehensions over the idea of international trial inspections. I believe these apprehensions are somewhat exaggerated. The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold such an experiment at a facility in Dzerzhinsk as soon as the procedures for it are arranged and agreement reached on starting such inspections in other countries. The Soviet delegation believes that it would be appropriate to agree on the most important problems to be studied in the experiment. We propose that this work should be begun as soon as possible. In our view, the membership of the international group of inspectors and observers for visits to facilities should be limited and should not exceed 10-20 persons.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of having a truly global convention. The ultimate goal should be universal participation of States in the convention. Naturally, it is for each State to decide, by weighing all the pros and cons, whether participation in the convention would or would not be in its national interest. Hence the conclusion that for the widest possible participation of States in the convention, it should provide certain benefits in terms of protection against chemical weapons for its participants who have renounced chemical weapons, as compared with other countries. In this context we attach great significance, in particular, to article X of the convention, dealing with assistance and protection against chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation would be prepared to support the idea of establishing a voluntary fund to render assistance to any State party against which chemical weapons were used. The fund would be an integral part of a mutual assistance mechanism within the international organization set up under the convention. We believe that financial resources and appropriate material facilities, including means of chemical protection, could be contributed to that fund.

In conclusion, a few words on the topic which has been repeatedly discussed both inside and outside the conference room - the forthcoming conference on chemical weapons to be attended by representatives of

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Governments and industry at Canberra in September. The Soviet Union has decided to particpate in this Conference. We are particularly satisfied with the fact that it will focus on joint action by Governments and industry aimed at the early conclusion and implementation of the convention banning chemical weapons. We believe, as I have already said, that taking into account legitimate interests of industry is essential for the success of the Geneva negotiations. From this standpoint the significance of the Canberra Conference is very great. The Soviet delegation at that conference will be prepared to make a constructive contribution to the discussions on the agenda items and to help it arrive at positive results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I thank him also for the warm congratulations to my delegation on the occasion of our national day and the very kind words addressed to my country and to me personally. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Let me first of all warmly congratulate you not only on the occasion of your national day but also on your assumption of the presidency during the month of July. I am confident that our work will greatly benefit from your diplomatic skill. That skill has been shown, inter alia, in your chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is therefore particularly appropriate to devote a plenary statement to this question under your presidency. I also take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico for his experienced guidance of the Conference during the past month. I have listened with great interest to the statement by His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State of Finland and to the other distinguished speakers before me.

In my statement today I will exclusively address the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Useful work has been carried out in the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular in its Ad Hoc Committee, in existence since 1985. The time should now be ripe to take stock of the extensive discussions and the many proposals which have been made. Our continued deliberations should be structured with a view to defining measures on how to prevent an arms race in outer space. An extension of the arms race into outer space could have profoundly destabilizing consequences. Deeply conscious of these risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

Although the civilian exploitation of outer space is increasing, the vast majority of satellites perform military functions. There is a great variety in their missions. Some of them play, or have a potential to play, a vital role in verifying compliance with arms limitation or disarmament agreements, or carry out crucial early-warning and communication tasks. These satellites thus have stabilizing functions. Some are in geosynchronous orbit, or in eccentric earth orbit, and others are in lower earth orbit. Mention could be made of reconnaissance satellites with photographic, electronic or

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ocean-surveillance tasks. In principle, all these satellites can have important functions in connection with weapons systems on earth. Their military role, however, is of a passive nature. Military support satellites may, nevertheless, be given more active assignments, for instance regarding target acquisition and identification, or other active support functions for military operations. The various types of satellites are becoming increasingly sophisticated and manoeuvrable.

In time of war, satellites could thus be important military targets. Consequently, there has long been a military interest in developing means for anti-satellite warfare. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have tested dedicated ASAT systems. Their actual deployment is, however, limited. One of the concepts comprised an interceptor launched into the same orbital plane as the target. The other system was an air-launched miniature vehicle with a terminal homing warhead. Both systems were reportedly capable of reaching targets in low earth orbit only.

There may be reason to recall the diversity of means of carrying out ASAT warfare A satellite can be disrupted, either by being physically destroyed or through interference with some of its vital functions. A satellite could for instance be destroyed by impact with space debris. Ballistic missiles could be modified for ASAT purposes. ABM-interceptors could have an inherent ASAT capability. To be effective, however, these weapons would have to be tested in an ASAT mode. Some potential ASAT weapons could in addition perform anti-ballistic-missile defence tasks. They could thus lend themselves to a circumvention of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the functions of a satellite could also be impaired by jamming or spoofing operations. Command and control communications could be interfered with in a similar fashion and the satellite's sensors incapacitated by laser radiation. Electronic warfare or high-power microwaves could also be used for such functions.

A whole literature has developed regarding technological research on potential earth-based or space-based weapon devices, related to kinetic energy or directed energy principles. One example is clusters of homing vehicles equipped with infra-red guidance. As to directed energy weapons, various lasers under consideration are the chemical laser, the free electron laser, the excimer laser, and the X-ray laser. The last is for obvious reasons the most controversial concept, since such a laser would have to be "pumped" by a nuclear explosion. Whereas some of the concepts referred to may carry a flavour of science finction, others could have a more realistic potential for ASAT tasks, although the context in which they are being considered apparently concerns ballistic missile defences. Satellites could be considerably easier to attack than missiles, because of their overall features as well as of their static orbit positions.

It may sometimes be difficult to make a clear distinction between dedicated ASAT weapons and non-dedicated capabilities to interfere with the normal functioning of a spacecraft. Any spacecraft capable of manoeuvring in orbit could be programmed to interfere with another space object. Even if a

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satellite can by itself function as an interceptor, to be considered as a dedicated ASAT weapon it should inter alia be equipped with interceptors aimed at destroying other satellites.

It goes without saying that many counter-measures could be conceived of against various contemplated or existing means of interfering with satellites. A satellite could, for example, be hardened against directed-energy weapons, if such devices were to be developed for ASAT purposes, infra-red sensors could be blinded by lasers, a satellite could be shut off, and satellites could be deployed in large numbers, etc.

Questions pertaining to the strategic balance are subject to bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers. However, the issue of ballistic missile defences is, along with the ASAT question, of relevance also to the Conference on Disarmament. All nations would be affected by a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, as well as by other possible destabilizing developments that are implied.

One contemplated BMD system would contain both space-based and so-called "pop-up" systems, based on the new "exotic" technologies I have referred to. Several counter-measures could be expected against such systems. Thus, to mention just one example, a warhead decoy could by simulation be made to respond like a re-entry vehicle and, conversely, a re-entry vehicle to respond like a decoy, etc. In accordance with a familiar pattern, counter-measures could indeed proliferate. At the same time, the decision-making process to a large extent will have to be assigned to supercomputers, etc. By such a development the survival of mankind would increasingly be getting into the grip of machines.

The many critics of ballistic missile defences have underlined the destabilizing implications. There is a great risk that an adversary with less efficient ballistic missile defences would be tempted to resort to a pre-emptive strike. Furthermore, if the two major nuclear and space Powers were really capable of developing ballistic missile defences, other nuclear-weapon States might feel incited to live up to their doctrine of effective deterrence by significantly increasing their nuclear weapons potential.

Both the leading nuclear and space Powers continue to devote considerable resources to research on ballistic missile defences, which may have adverse implications for the ABM Treaty, and probably also for the ongoing nuclear and space talks. However, a shift in emphasis seems to be under way in favour of ASAT programmes. One reason for such a development may be attributed to the fact that, as pointed out by SIPRI in its 1989 Yearbook, a major increase has taken place in the number and capabilities of operational military satellites in several categories. This expansion also involves an increased integration of various space-based systems with land, sea and air forces, thereby enhancing their capabilities in several respects.

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Given the fact that it may be relatively easy to develop various types of ASAT weapons, other States, too, may consider strengthening their military capacities by acquiring such weapons. Already the spread of advanced missile technology could promote such a development. Increased dedicated or non-dedicated ASAT capabilities represent new risks already of accidental interference with satellites, which could have serious implications for international security.

The risk of an arms race in outer space has been partly attributed to the fact that the existing body of international law is not sufficient to effectively prevent such a development. The relevant provisions are both of a general and a specific nature. I do not intend to go over existing agreements pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, since this has been done by my delegation on previous occasions, as well as by several other delegations. It may be sufficient to touch upon a few examples.

Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations outlaws the use of force and the threat of use of force. In certain cases some might argue that an attack on a space object would be a measure of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. It is, however, inconceivable that this Article could be interpreted as permitting attacks on non-military space objects. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbits and on celestial bodies, but no other weapons systems. The Moon Treaty, which aims at entirely demilitarizing outer space, with the exception of the proximity of the Earth, has been signed by very few States indeed and has not yet entered into force. The Registration Convention may have some confidence-building functions, but, as pointed out by many delegations, would need to be more effectively complied with. It would also have to be strengthened by additional provisions.

As to various pertinent bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, emphasis should be given to the significant stabilizing role of the 1972 AMB Treaty. It is conceived of as a crucial building block in the strategic relationship between the two major nuclear and space Powers. Many States have therefore repeatedly urged the two Parties to the Treaty to secure its continuation.

Other bilateral disarmament agreements, which are relevant in this context are, for example, the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which secure a protection for early warning satellites, thus indicating the vital stabilizing function attributed by the two major Powers to such satellites. There may also be reason to recall the unratified SALT II Treaty, which prohibited the testing and deployment of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS). Relevant parts of the provisions of these Treaties can be of interest also for multilateral purposes.

My delegation has consistently been in favour of a comprehensive solution to the ASAT question. Even if a comprehensive ASAT ban may not be achievable in a short-term perspective - given the wide-ranging issues involved,

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pertaining inter alia to definitions and dual functions - it is, however, of the utmost importance that we start work on delineating measures that would at least provide for basic legal provisions with regard to ASAT systems. We should also aim at strengthening the confidence-building régime, and introduce measures aiming at the prevention of accidents with satellites. In the opinion of my delegation, the approach will have to build on a combination of confidence-building and functional measures, together with a ban on anti-satellite weapons.

As an immediate measure the Swedish delegation has proposed that the present de facto moratorium by the two major space Powers on testing of existing dedicated ASAT systems be formalized. Production as well as deployment of dedicated ASATs should be prohibited without delay, and existing ASAT systems should be dismantled. Furthermore, the testing of non-dedicated systems in an ASAT mode should be prohibited. I have previously touched upon various types of non-dedicated systems, which would have to be addressed here. This approach would thus in a functional way comprise all convertible ASATs.

Furthermore, rules aiming at diminishing the risk of accidents should be introduced. Given the relatively large number of satellites in low earth orbit, measures to prevent accidents in that area are urgently called for. But also satellites in the geostationary orbit should, obviously, be covered, since they are of crucial importance for international stability and security.

Several proposals have been made in the Conference on Disarmament concerning the question of indirect protection of satellites, including rules of the road, keep-out zones, codes of conduct, immunity for satellites, etc. These proposals should be discussed in a systematic way with a view to defining relevant measures. It will also have to be established to what extent various proposed measures should be dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament, or should be referred, for instance, to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Sweden has proposed that an expert group be established under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Such a group should discuss the feasibility of relevant measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It should also consider verification of compliance with such measures, as well as focus on questions pertaining to the establishment of an international satellite monitoring system.

Verification could be carried out by many different methods, in particular on-site inspection, as well as satellite tracking and data collection. Inspection of a satellite from the ground could, at least in the case of low earth orbit, be performed by the help of telescopes with modern electro-optical sensors. Other means could be various radar devices. These new systems can give detailed accounts of satellites. Fly-by or co-orbiting can be used for observation. In the context of verification by means of satellites the Canadian PAXSAT concept is of great relevance. Consideration should also be given to the establishment of an international satellite

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agency, taking into account the various proposals that over the years have been made in the United Nations and in the Conference on Disarmament. Such an agency could have at its disposal a network of observation stations and make use of common data bases.

The question of how to prevent an arms race in outer space is often referred to as an unusually complex one. We should, however, not let ourselves be overwhelmed by the difficulties. As I have tried to illustrate, there are several measures that the Conference on Disarmament could usefully negotiate, namely: dedicated ASAT weapons could be comprehensively banned; an agreement could be made on banning the testing in an ASAT mode of various types of non-dedicated systems; appropriate verification régimes could be scheduled, and an international satellite monitoring system be established; confidence-building measures, including rules of the road, could be adopted.

My delegation holds that these measures should be introduced as a matter of urgency, given the risks of vertical and horizontal proliferation of dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities, as well as the dangers posed by possible non-intentional harmful interference with satellites. These measures should be subject to multilateral negotiations in the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, that is to say the Conference on Disarmament, and more precisely in its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

My delegation is fully aware of the fact that the least common denominator in the CD has hitherto not allowed for a more measure-oriented approach. As stated at the beginning of my intervention, however, Sweden is of the view that time is now ripe for more structured work in the subsidiary body of the Conference, allowing us to more purposefully address the task before us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for his statement and for the congratulations and kind words that he addressed to the presidency.

We have reached the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation expresses its thanks to you, Mr. President, and also to the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Batsanov, and at the same time to all other delegations which have acted similarly in the course of the past few days for the sympathies and condolences addressed to the Hungarian Government and our delegation on the occasion of the passing away of Mr. Janos Kadar, a prominent politician and outstanding State figure of my country for more than 30 years. My delegation will not fail to convey the expressions of condolences to the Hungarian Government and to the family of the deceased.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement. Are there any further speakers? That seems not to be the case.

You will recall that, at its 513th plenary meeting, the Conference decided to hold an informal meeting on Tuesday, 18 July, immediately after the plenary meeting, for consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. It was understood that if the debate was not concluded at that informal meeting, another informal meeting would be held on Thursday, 20 July, also after the plenary meeting scheduled for that date. Keeping in mind those dates, non-members of the Conference parties to the Sea-bed Treaty were invited to transmit their requests for participation not later than today, 11 July, so that members might consider such requests in accordance with the rules of procedure and the secretariat might have time to process the relevant draft decisions. Accordingly, I hope that non-members Parties to the Treaty wishing to participate in the informal meeting on 18 July will communicate their requests to the secretariat not later than today at 4 p.m. For your information, the secretariat has already received eight requests, which will be circulated after 4 p.m. today in delegations' boxes for consideration by members. I shall put the relevant draft decisions before the Conference at the end of the list of speakers at the plenary meeting on Tuesday, 18 July, before we open the informal meeting devoted to the subject to be discussed. In connection with the informal meeting, I should like to inform you that immediately after we adjourn this plenary meeting, the secretariat will open a list of speakers wishing to address the informal meeting. Of course, members intending to do so may ask for the floor without putting their names on the list first, in accordance with the practice followed for informal meetings of the Conference.

There is no other business for today. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 13 July at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.